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ABSTRAK
Membangun kelembagaan yang”terpercaya dan terprediksi “adalah langkah yang baik 
di dalam mendukung sebuah sistem otonomi daerah di Indonesia. Makalah ini mencoba 
melihat kondisi aturan main yang belum sempurna di dalam proses perencanaan dan 
implementasi Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja daerah (APBN) di tingkat Kabupaten. Bukti 
empiris menunjukan bahwa pendelegasian kewenangan dari pemerintah pusat ke 
pemerintah daerah kabupaten telah mendorong elit lokal untuk menyalahgunakan 
kekuasaan di dalam proses APBD. Hal ini terjadi karena proses pendelegasian kewenangan 
itu tidak juga disertai pendelegasian pengawasan, penegakan, akuntabilitas serta lemahnya 
kontrol masyarakat.  
Keywords: Dysfunctional institutions, asymmetric information and lack of enforcement 
INTRODUCTION
Building reliable institutions is an important 
feature in the case of regional autonomy 
transformation in Indonesia (Jaya, 2003, 2004). 
Jaya (2004) argue that of the crucial 
preconditions for Indonesia regional autonomy 
transition is to build institutions that support a 
regional autonomy’s rules of the game and 
create incentives for regional autonomy 
players. In fact, in the first year of regional 
autonomy policy implementation in 2001, the 
rules of the game of regional autonomy regime 
is unstable and changing and complexity and 
too many conflicts of vested interest emerged 
both vertically and horizontally. Consequently, 
this conditions triggered dysfunctional 
institutions such as corruption, rent seeker and 
negative lobbying.  
Burky and Perry (1998: 14) argue that 
dysfunctional institutions in public adminis-
tration were caused by a lack of information 
and enforcement in the role of principal-agent 
relationships in government. The terms of 
principal-agent can be defined as follows. 
Given the new democratic paradigm that now 
exists in Indonesia, it is appropriate to identify 
the principal as the country’s voters or 
constituents. The servants of the people’s will 
are the politicians or council members or other 
representatives that have been voted to office 
by the people. All these representatives are the 
‘agents’ who are acting on behalf of the 
principals. Moreover, Jaya (2004) states the 
new regional autonomy laws and regulations 
have not been accompanied by the esta-
blishment of enforcement agencies; therefore 
this condition leads principal-agent problems.  
The principal-agent relationship is very an 
important aspect in hierarchy organisations 
such as the state. North (1991 47) points out 
that “hierarchies that evolve with more 
complex organisation entail formal structures 
to specify principal/agent relationship”. The 
hierarchy of such rules, from constitutions, to 
stature and common laws, to specify by law, 
and finally to individual contracts defines 
2005 Kirana Jaya 121
constraints, from general rules to particular 
specifications (North, 1991). Furobotn and 
Richter (1998) argue that the members of 
government and their administrators are the 
agents, while the voters are the principals in the 
Principal-agent relationship.  
Rondinnelli, (1999) argues that in the 
context of delegation and devolution in relation 
to the balancing of central and local interest, 
decentralisation can be characterised as 
principal-agent relationship. However, some 
scholars argue that there are some obstacles to 
good governance in decentralised systems. 
Martinez-Vasquez and Nab, (1997) claim that 
first, domination by local elites. They identified 
“one danger of fiscal decentralisation in 
developing countries is that local government 
may become controlled by local elites”. 
Second, corruption enhanced decentralised 
governance. Similarly, some scholars such as 
Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (2000) and 
Carbonera (2000) also argue that decentralised 
system created more corruption at the local 
level. Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998) argue 
that decentralisation result in local 
governments capture. Prud’homme (1995) also 
argues that corruption may be greater at the 
local level. He explains that local officials 
usually have more discretionary powers than 
central government and local elite are likely to 
be more subject to pressing demands from local 
interest groups. Therefore, the study will 
examine the relationship between 
decentralisation and corruption. 
The study includes two main sources of 
data, primary and secondary. Primary data are 
collected through surveys, in-depth interview 
and personnel observations. Secondary data 
includes already existing documents, such as 
local government finance statistics publications 
and project reports. Therefore, in the next 
discussion, we will use a combination of 
secondary and primary data including surveys 
and interviews of key decision –makers, 
political and NGOs. 
The definition of local elites falls into three 
categories: local bureaucrats, local councils and 
local communities who have some control of 
Kabupaten fiscal resources. The in-depth 
interviews upon which this analysis is based 
required us to find proxies to represent each of 
these levels of government: the local 
government budget committee (Panitia 
anggaran) represented local bureaucrats; the 
local Kabupaten council budget committee 
represented the local councils; and the local 
businessmen, NGOs and university experts 
represented the local community.  
The Concept of Dysfunctional Institutions 
Mehmet (1994:1) argued that the rate of 
economic development is inversely 
dysfunctional institutional. A principal source 
of dysfunctional institutions is state 
opportunistic behaviour, such as rent-seeking, 
corruption, lobbying and kick back, which 
generate transaction cost and welfare losses, 
causing cost-push inflation.  
Corruption 
Many economists have long argued that 
corruption is attracting a lot of attention around 
the world. The rate of economic development 
is inversely related to institutional inefficiency 
(North, 1981). Institutional inefficiency is 
caused by rent-seeking, corruption and 
lobbying. Tanzi (1998) argues that definition of 
corruption is that it is the abuse of public power 
for private. According to Mauro (1997) causes 
of corruption are trade restriction, government 
subsidies, price control, multiple exchange rate 
practices and foreign exchange, low wages in 
the civil services, natural resource 
endowments, and sociological factors. He also 
illustrates that consequences of corruption are 
lowers investment and retards economic 
growth, talent will be misallocated, reduce the 
effectiveness of aid flows through the diversion 
funds, loss of tax revenue, adverse budgetary 
consequences, lower quality of infrastructure 
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and public services and distort the composition 
of government expenditure (Mauro, 1997:5-6). 
Some empirical studies of corruption have 
been done intensively. Tanzi and Davoodi 
(1998) have investigated corruption also 
distorts the effects of industrial policy on 
investment. They also argue that corruption 
reduces tax revenue, mainly because of the 
impact that it has on the administration and on 
customs, thus reducing the ability of the 
government to carry out needed public 
expenditure. . Charap and Harm (1999) and 
Khan and Jomo, (2000:8) and argue that 
corruption patterns are endogenous to political 
structures. Corruption is usually defined as the 
transgression of formal rules governing the 
allocation of public resources by officially in 
response to offers of financial gain or political 
support. Bardhan, (1997) identified 
institutional and incentive structures can 
determine the magnitude and effects of 
corruption. Meanwhile, Shleifer and Vishny, 
(1993) claim that states with a much centralised 
institutional structure may suffer less from the 
damaging effects of corruption than states with 
an intermediate level of institutional 
centralisation.  
However, little attention has been given in 
existing studies of corruption, notable in the 
case of regional autonomy in unitary state. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the 
corruption and regional autonomy, especially 
from centralised corruption move to 
decentralised corruption.  
Rent Seeking and Lobbying 
Rent seeking becomes a major issue in 
developing countries. Khan and Jomo (2000) 
argue that the term of ‘rent’ is used to describe 
incomes, which are above normal in some 
senses or excess incomes that should not exist 
in efficient market. For example: lobbying, 
bribes, contribution to political parties (legal), 
expenditure on private media (illegal) and 
patron-client networks. Krueger, (1974) argued 
that a principal source of institutional 
inefficiency is rent seeking. Rent seeking 
activity is costly to the economy when it 
becomes widespread. Similarly, Khan and 
Jomo (2000) argue that the term of ‘rent’ is 
used to describe incomes, which are above 
normal in some senses. However, conventional 
models of rent seeking are unable to explain 
how it can drive decades of rapid growth in 
some countries. Khan and Jomo (2000) argue 
that lobbying is one of the rent-seeking 
expenditure. Unlike corruption, the lobbying 
function is the cornerstone of pressure group 
theories of regulation and protection. The 
significant of this is that lobbying is one of 
important rent seeking to be studied in the 
context economic opportunistic behaviour in 
developing countries. 
Indonesia is an excellent laboratory for the 
study of economic and institutional dynamics 
in the context of regional autonomy. Indonesia 
represents “state transformation” or an 
institution shift from a highly centralised, 
authoritarian and corrupt regime to more 
decentralised, democratic and yet still corrupt 
regime. In the mid-1999 Indonesia introduced 
State transformation namely, through Law no 
22, 1999 (Regional Autonomy) and Law no 25, 
1999 (Fiscal Balance between Central and 
Regional Government). Formally, Law no 22, 
1999 was made an attempt to democratise the 
regional government political process, and to 
devolve certain powers of governments to the 
regional governments. Meanwhile, Law 25, 
1999 is designed to support that shift of power 
to the local government by providing more 
fiscal resources (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 
2000). 
However, in the first year of regional 
autonomy in 2001, the rules of the game of 
regional autonomy regime is unstable and 
changing. When the rules of the game are 
unstable and changing, consequently, it is 
difficult to define appropriate incentive and 
monitoring devices in contracts between 
principal and agents. The choice of contracts 
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will depend on the costs of transaction. When 
information is asymmetrically distributed, 
principal-agent relationship can give rise to 
adverse selection (hidden information) and 
moral hazard (hidden action). In fact, in the 
context of the behaviour of State agencies, 
potential corruption, collusion and nepotism 
are evidence of dysfunctional institutions, 
stemming from weakness in the institutional 
framework.  
Dysfunctional Institutions as reflected by 
evidence in the operation of local 
government budgets 
Before studying the role of bureaucrats, 
local councils and the communities in local 
government budget decision-making process, 
this section maps out the general pattern of 
decision-making for expenditures by the local 
elites as revealed in the secondary literature. 
Accountability of local government to local 
community is the most important step for 
successful decentralisation reform in Indonesia. 
Some scholars argue that the decentralisation 
reforms have opened up new channels of 
accountability. This is widely interpreted as 
having a positive effect on Indonesia by 
bringing government closer to the local people. 
On the other hand, the reforms also appear to 
have opened new channels for the abuse of 
power (Mink et al., 2002: 70). Now the Bupati 
must give an annual verbal report to the local 
council when he presents his budget paper, the 
incentive for the local bureaucrats to bribe the 
local council has increased as a way of getting 
their approval of the report. In the pre-reform 
era, the budget papers were simply submitted 
by the Bupati to the local council, were 
automatically approved by them without 
scrutiny, and then forwarded on to the central 
government in Jakarta.  
Understanding exactly how local elites 
abuse their power within the local government 
budgetary process requires us to identify the 
main characteristics of local councils, the roles 
of the Bupati and the Wakil Bupati and the 
expenditure patterns.1. As a first approxi-
mation, an estimate of the degree of abuse of 
power can be gauged from comparing the 
actual expenditure as shown in the local 
government budget (APBD) with the 
“standard” budget formula as expressed in 
various documents such as the Central 
Government Regulation, 2000 (PP 109 and 
110, 2000).2 The former refers to rules 
governing expenditures by local councils and 
the latter refers to the expenditures by Bupatis 
and Wakil Bupatis. The main purpose of the 
standard budget formulae as expressed in the 
Government Regulations was to prevent local 
council members, Bupatis and Wakil Bupatis 
from allocating too much money for their own 
benefit and remuneration (WBRPEROR, 2003: 
62). In the following sections we will consider 
the precise nature of how power has been 
abused at two levels of local government: first 
within the local councils and second at the 
Bupati and Wakil Bupati levels.  
An analysis of Indication the abuse of power 
at the level of the Local Councils  
Table 1 compares the expected level of 
expenditure according to the standard formula 
with the actual expenditure in 2000 (before the 
reforms were introduced) and 2001 (in the first 
year of the reforms) for the three Kabupatens 
of Sleman, Badung and Kupang. The 
information shows a dramatic shift in the 
relationship between expected from PP110 and 
actual expenditures. Before the reforms, actual 
expenditure was typically less than the 
expected volume of expenditure. This is 
because the local councils were conforming 
strictly to the formula. In 2001 after the 
reforms, actual expenditures began to outstrip 
expected expenditure.  
                                                          
1  The latter are described in  detail in Appendix 6.1 which 
gives the total expenditure for 2000 (pre-reform) and 
2001 (post-reform) by the local councils, the Bupati and 
the Wakil Bupati.   
2  PP 109 and PP 110 are the actual names of relevant 
government regulations. 
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Table 1. Local Council (DPRD) Expenditure in Rupiah, 2000 and 2001 
Kabupaten Pre Reform (2000) Post Reform (2001) 
 Expected 
Standard 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Actual 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Percentage 
Difference 
 
% 
Expected 
Standard 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Actual 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Percentage 
Difference 
 
% 
Kab. Sleman 4.2 1.8 -57.1 4.5 6.6 46.7 
Kab. Badung 3.9 3.7 -5.1 5.0 9.5 90.0 
Kab. Kupang 1.3 0.9 -30.8 1.9 1.9 0 
Source: calculated from detail local government budget (APBD) year 2000 and 2001 
  
In the cases of both Sleman and Badung, the 
discrepancy was large, indeed almost double. 
The exception was Kupang, where expected 
and actual expenditure were in balance. 
The aggregate divergence between expected 
and actual expenditure for Badung in Table 1 is 
also the largest of the three Kabupatens. This 
divergence indicates that in post-reform era, 
there is a wilful attitude of local councils to 
routinely ignore central directives and 
guidelines. One factor that facilitates this 
wilfulness is that government regulation 
PP110/2000 does not specify fixed amounts of 
expected expenditure for any individual items 
in the budget. Second factor is that Law 
22/1999 higher position than PP 110/2000. The 
one exception is ‘operational facilities’, but in 
this case there is much room for manipulation 
because the government formula states only the 
minimum and maximum amounts rather than a 
fixed average.  
In addition, Table 2 shows exactly on 
which budgetary items the deviations between 
expected and actual expenditures occurred. 
These details reveal that in Sleman the 
deviations were on the whole small, with the 
one exception of expenditure on ‘operational 
facilities’ (fasilitas operasional). By contrast, 
in the case of Badung Kabupaten, Table 2 
shows that a number of major deviations 
amongst numerous items especially represen-
tation subsidy (tunjangan representasi), post 
allowance for leaderships (tunjangan jabatan 
ketua) and operational facilities. However, 
Table 2 shows that Kupang council expenditure 
items follow the PP110 formula, except 
expenditure operational facilities. 
To conclude, the analysis of government 
budgetary data shows that local councils have 
not followed PP 110. In other word, the 
regional autonomy reform created indication of 
abuse of power by local politician. In other 
words, PP 110 has failed to prevent local 
council members from allocating excessive 
amounts of money for their own benefit and 
remuneration (WBRPEROR, 2003: 62)  
The conclusions reached above have been 
verified by other scholars such as Banfield 
(1979: 98). They argue that the ‘decentralised 
political systems are more corruptible and is 
always attended by an increase in the number 
of persons who are involved in corrupt acts’. 
Similarly, other scholars such as Prud’homme 
(1995) and Tanzi (1998) and Carbonera (2000) 
also support the finding. They argue that 
decentralised system created more corruption at 
the local level. 
In the next section the expenditure patterns 
of the Bupati and wakil Bupati will be 
examined to see whether the use of 
discretionary local power was any different. 
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Table 2. Percentage difference between PP110 and Actual Local Council (DPRD) Expenditure 
in Rupiah, 2000 / 2001 
Kabupaten Pre Reform (2000) Post Reform (2001) Sleman Badung Kupang Sleman Badung Kupang 
Representation subsidy 
Packet subsidy 
Post allowance for Leadership 
Commission allowance 
Committee allowance 
Special allowance 
Welfare allowance 
Operational activities 
Housing allowance 
59.9 
2.2 
68.9 
-13.8 
-146.5 
0 
0 
-736.5 
0 
55.4 
42.3 
-128 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-41.6 
0 
55.0 
34.9 
66.5 
32.6 
-17.0 
0 
0 
49.6 
0 
1.1 
1.1 
0 
0 
16.9 
0 
0 
-716.2 
0 
-981 
0 
-415.7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-8.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-20.4 
0 
Source: calculated from detail Sleman, Badung and Kupang government budget (APBD) year 2000 and 
2001 
 
An analysis of indication the abuse of power 
at the level of the Local Government 
Executives (Bupati and Wakil Bupati)
Given our analysis of what has been 
happening at the level of the local councils in 
Indonesia, it is perhaps not surprising to learn 
that the abuse of power by the Bupati and the 
Wakil Bupati is not significantly different 
(Table 3). The following analysis of the 
expenditure patterns at this level shows that 
Bupati and Wakil Bupati abused their power 
less than their counterparts in the Local 
Councils. Since decentralisation, their 
expenditure patterns have not increased 
dramatically. At the same time, there is no 
question that power has been abused for the 
simple reason that neither the Bupati nor the 
Wakil-Bupati has followed the standard 
expenditures that could be expected from the 
formulae governing PP 109/2000. 
Table 3 shows that even during the pre-
reform era, the Bupati and Wakil Bupati 
apparently abused their power. In all three 
Kabupaten regions, actual expenditures always 
exceeded the expected expenditure to a 
considerable degree. In the case of Sleman the 
discrepancy was dramatic: a nearly three-fold 
difference. The information also shows an 
interesting and unexpected anomaly in the 
history of new abuse of power at the local level 
 
Table 3. Discrepancy between Expected and Actual Expenditures of the Bupati and Wakil
Bupati, 2000 and 2001 
Kabupaten Pre Reform (2000) Post Reform (2001) 
 Expected 
Standard 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Actual 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Percentage 
Difference 
 
% 
Expected 
Standard 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Actual 
Billion 
Rupiah 
Percentage 
Difference 
 
% 
Kab. Sleman 0.5 1.4 180 0.5 0.8 60 
Kab. Badung 1.7 2.1 24 1.1 1.5 36 
Kab. Kupang 0.3 0.5 67 0.5 0.5 0 
Source: calculated from detailed local government budgets (APBD) in 2000 and 2001 
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in Indonesia. After decentralisation in 2001, the 
difference between expected and actual 
expenditure declined dramatically in Sleman 
and Kupang. In the case of Kupang, there was 
zero difference by 2001, suggesting no abuse 
of power. In the case of Sleman, the 
discrepancy fell by 66 per cent. The situation in 
Badung was more stable with a slight increase 
in abuse of power.313 
Why did the abuse of power decline (or 
increase only slightly in the case of Badung) 
after the new decentralisation laws, when the 
same laws gave rise to a massive increase in 
abuse of power at the local council level (see 
previous section). The answer most likely lies 
in the simple fact that the new laws made the 
Bupati and wakil Bupati more cautious about 
their actions. After 2000 they were expected to 
report to the local councils who had the power 
to question them about serious discrepancies. 
To avoid such bureaucratic attention, they kept 
their books clean.  
By contrast, the local councils became 
dramatically more abusive in their power 
because no one at the local level was keeping 
them in check. Their reports went directly to 
the Central Government in Jakarta where 
officials were far less familiar or concerned 
with developments at the local level. As we 
saw in Paper 3, during the last twelve months 
further legislation has been introduced to bring 
about better control of the expenditure patterns 
of the local councils. An important conclusion 
emerges from this analysis. The regional 
autonomy reform had a contradictory impact at 
different levels of government. As far as the 
Bupati and Wakil Bupati were concerned, the 
new law made them more accountable. The 
opposite was true of the local councils, who 
                                                          
313 Further details provided in Appendix 1 show that the 
chief deviations between anticipated and actual expen-
diture occurred under the headings of post-allowance 
(tunjangan jabatan) and operating cost (biaya operasi).  
These were presumably the expenditure items most 
readily inflatable, while other items presented less 
opportunity for creative accounting. 
were merely accountable at a long distance 
away from the central authority, which had 
little means to carry out local scrutiny.  
The conclusions reached above have been 
verified by other scholars. Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (1998) argue that decentralisation 
result in local governments capture. 
Prud’homme (1995) also argues that corruption 
may be greater at the local level. He explains 
that local officials usually have more 
discretionary powers than central government 
and local elite are likely to be more subject to 
pressing demands from local interest groups. 
Jaya and Dick (2001) and Mink et al (2002: 11) 
argue that the local councils and the new 
Bupati and Wakil Bupati have increasingly 
started to act as little kings (raja kecil).414 
Similarly, the report by WBRPEROR (2003) 
argued that PP 110 had failed to prevent DPRD 
members from allocating too much money to 
them.  
PERCEPTION OF INSTITUTION 
MATTERS IN THE CASE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT BUDGET  
Burky and Perry (1998: 14) argue that 
dysfunctional institutions in public 
administration were caused by a lack of 
information and enforcement in the role of 
principal-agent relationships in government. 
For the purposes of the analysis in this paper 
we will also study the nature of the principal-
agent relationship. The terms of principal-agent 
can be defined as follows. Given the new 
democratic paradigm that now exists in 
Indonesia, it is appropriate to identify the 
principal as the country’s voters or 
constituents. The servants of the people’s will 
are the politicians or council members or other 
representatives that have been voted to office 
by the people. All these representatives are the 
                                                          
414In addition to the label  raja kecil, it is also common to 
hear the term “Soeharto kecil”, an obvious reference to 
the wealth of former President Soeharto—often acknow-
ledged to have been amassed through corrupt practices 
and behind-the-scenes deal-making. 
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‘agents’ who are acting on behalf of the 
principals.  
The literature about governance and the 
principal-agent relationship has also identified 
four important institutional variables that need 
to be tested when discussing the efficiency of 
government:  
 Transparency 
 The monitoring and enforcement of 
directives; 
 Lobbying  
 The role of incentives. 
These variables will be discussed below in 
the analysis of the institutional setting within 
which the abuse of power by the local elite 
occurs. Again, the focus is on the formulation 
and implementation of local government 
(Kabupaten) budgets. This section of the paper 
uses data collected from questionnaires and 
surveys administered by the author in the three 
Kabupatens: Sleman, Badung and Kupang. 
Questionnaires were distributed to local elites 
who have the power in local government 
budget decision-making process such as, local 
government budget committee; local council 
budget committee and local government budget 
watch (NGOs).  
In the descriptive statistics analysis, all 
variables were measured on a five-point Likert 
scale indicating respondents’ opinions about 
statements in our questionnaire. The five 
options were labelled  
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree 
3 = neutral 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
Therefore, we conducted a survey in three 
Kabupatens that asked respondents the degree 
to which they agreed (score of 5) or disagreed 
(score of 1) with the following statements (see 
also questionnaire in appendix 2). 
 Do you agree that the new institutional 
change in the context of regional autonomy 
has increased Kabupaten budget transpa-
rency 
 Do you agree that the new institutional 
change in the context of regional autonomy 
has provided clear monitoring an enforce-
ment tools with respect to Kabupaten 
government budget process 
 Do you agree that the new institutional 
change in the context of regional autonomy 
has changed form of lobbying to Kabupaten 
government bureaucrats and Kabupaten 
council with respect to Kabupaten 
government budget process 
 Do you agree that the new institutional 
change in the context of regional autonomy 
has given positive incentive with respect to 
the behaviour of local government 
bureaucrats and local council in manage the 
Kabupaten government budget 
Transparency 
According to International Monetary Fund 
(2001: 2), fiscal transparency can be defined 
into four: first, clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, second, public availability of 
information, third, open budget preparation, 
execution and reporting and assurances of 
integrity. Similarly, Kopits and Craig (1998), 
point out that fiscal transparency emphasises 
being open to the public about the structure and 
functions of government, fiscal policy 
intentions, pubic sector accounts and fiscal 
projections. However, this study used local 
government budget transparency such as open 
exchange of information between constituents 
and local council and between local council 
and local government bureaucrats. 
Access to information is the most important 
aspect of the principal-agent theory. In the 
section, in our closed questionnaire, the 
respondents were asked whether agree and not 
agree that the new institutional change in the 
context of regional autonomy has increased 
Kabupaten budget transparency. The results are 
reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Perception on Transparency  
Survey Item Sleman Badung Kupang Total Average 
The institutional change has promoted a more 
open exchange of information between voters 
(principal) and the local council (agent) 
2.7 (1.1) 3.0 (1.1) 2.7 (1.0) 2.8 (1.0) 
The institutional change has promoted a more 
open exchange of information between the 
local council (principal) and the local 
government budget committee (agent)  
3.2 (1.4) 2.8 (0.9) 3.5 (1.0) 3.2 (1.1) 
Number of samples  
Source: Survey Data                                            
30 21 22 73 
 
Table 4 shows that the overall mean score 
was below 4 (2.8) representing that respondents 
relative disagreed to agree that the institutional 
changes since 2001 have increased more 
transparency between voters and the local 
council. Their responsibilities to the voters 
were of a lower order; or did not exist at all. In 
other words, the accountability of local council 
members to the voters was very low. This also 
means that the budgetary process at this level 
was not transparent. Using the Non-Parametric 
(NPar) Kruskal-Wallis test for three unrelated 
groups indicated that the samples were 
different from each other with a statistically 
significant p value of <0.10. There is 
significant different in the three Kabupatens. 
However, in Table 4 shows that the overall 
mean score was below 4 (3.2) indicating that 
respondents neutral to agree that that the 
institutional changes since 2001 have increased 
transparency between the local council and the 
local government. A Kruskal-Wallis test for 
three unrelated groups indicated that the 
samples were not different from each other 
with a statistically insignificant p value of 
>0.05. Based on the open questionnaire, most 
respondents in Sleman report that the 
information mechanism is now accessible, but 
it takes a long way of education for the 
community to access such information. They 
also view that people are involved only in the 
public hearing at the end of the discussion, 
which is no longer give any influences. Most 
respondents in Kabupaten Badung reported 
similar perceptions to those found in Sleman. 
They viewed that The APBD decision process 
involves only the executive and the legislative. 
NGO, university and community do not have 
any information on the process of APBD 
approving. Similarly, in Kabupaten Kupang, 
most respondents insist that the process of 
implementation and allocation of the APBD is 
not yet open.  
Overall, therefore, it can be argued that the 
local government budgetary process since the 
new decentralisation laws is not properly 
transparent and much more needs to be done to 
make the agents more accountable to the 
constituency of voters and the local council that 
represents the voter interests. 
This brings us to a final question for the 
section: how can the process of formulating the 
local government budget become more 
transparent and accountable? One obvious way 
is to improve the quality and frequency of 
information flow and communication between 
local government executives and 
representatives of the general public. Amongst 
the latter are the NGOs, the universities and 
general business community, all of which at the 
present are excluded from receiving 
information about the budgetary processes of 
local governments. Another obstacle to 
accountability and transparency that needs to 
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be addressed is the poor understanding that 
local council members themselves have of 
what their roles should be in the budgetary 
processes.  
Monitoring and Enforcement of Proper 
Codes of Conduct  
Monitoring and the enforcement of proper 
codes of conduct are important tools to achieve 
functional institutions. Some scholars argue 
that monitoring and separate enforcement 
institutions are critical to ensuring that the 
agents of government will act according to the 
principal’s interest (Burky and Perry, 1998: 
14). Therefore, in this section respondents were 
asked whether agree or not agree that the new 
institutional change in the context of regional 
autonomy has provided clear monitoring an 
enforcement tools with respect to Kabupaten 
government budget process.  
Table 5 shows that the overall mean score 
was below 4 (3.3) representing that respondents 
relative more neutral to agree that the 
institutional changes since the introduction of 
regional autonomy had provided better 
monitoring and enforcement tools for local 
government executives in the local government 
budgetary process. A Kruskal-Wallis test for 
three unrelated groups indicated that the 
samples were not different from each other 
with a statistically insignificant p value of 
>0.05.  
Similarly in Table 5 shows that the overall 
mean score was below 4 or (3.2) indicating that 
respondents relative close between neutral to 
agree that the institutional changes since 2001 
have increased transparency between the local 
council and the local government. A Kruskal-
Wallis test for three unrelated groups indicated 
that the samples were not different from each 
other with a statistically insignificant p value of 
>0.05. 
Based on the open questionnaire, most 
respondents in Sleman report that the role of 
formal control is existent, but because there has 
been no formal manual which are agreed, the 
process of formal monitoring becomes less 
effective. Most respondents in Kabupaten 
Badung reported different perceptions to those 
found in Sleman. They view that controls of 
BAWASDA, ITJEN Depdagri, BEPEKA and 
BPKP at implementation level created a 
conflict of interest and even sometimes are 
overlapping. Similarly, in Kabupaten Kupang, 
the respondents say that regional autonomy has 
not provided much improvement to monitoring 
and enforcement. Even sometimes are 
overlapping. BEPEKA and BPKP are more 
repressive controllers.  
  
Table 5. Perception of Monitoring and Enforcement Tools 
Survey Item Sleman Badung Kupang Total Average 
The institutional change has improved 
monitoring and enforcement to Local 
Government 
3.3 (1.1) 3.1 (1.0) 3.6 (0.8) 3.3 (0.9) 
The institutional change has improved 
monitoring and enforcement to Local 
Council (DPRD) 
2.9 (1.2) 2.9 (1.0) 3.7 (0.9) 3.2 (1.0) 
Number of samples  
Source: Survey Data                                
30 21 22 73 
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Furthermore, even though law 22 and law 
25 required the Kabupaten government to 
publish information about plans and budgets, 
this had not happened and the information was 
not accessible to the public. The absence of 
monitoring was facilitated by the way in which 
regional autonomy created overlapping and 
confusing jurisdictions. Before 2000, 
bureaucratic orders and responsibilities 
conformed to vertical accountability from the 
central government in Jakarta down to the local 
councils in regional centres. After the reforms, 
this simple system was replaced by a 
restructured system of vertical accountability 
that also sat alongside a system of horizontal 
accountability that operated at the local level 
between local councils, Bupati and Wakil 
Bupati. Such overlapping and confusion 
worked to the advantage of those wanting to 
form opportunistic alliances because it was 
now more difficult for central government to 
monitor the behaviour of government officials 
and ensure that that conformed to appropriate 
standards of conduct. Most Respondents in the 
three Kabupaten suggest an urgent need to 
involve civil society organisations more 
actively in monitoring local government budget 
processes. Budgetary watchdogs need to be 
created through stakeholder forums and the 
parliamentary process itself. It is also necessary 
to hold periodic meetings between the local 
council members with the local community of 
voters so that there is a system for generating 
feedback for local councils and reminding 
officials that they are being monitored. 
Similarly it is necessary to institute more and 
better processes for public reporting by the 
executive branches of government agencies.  
Lobbying Modus 
Lobbying modus by the local elite in the 
local government budget decision-making 
process has changed dramatically since 2000. 
With decentralisation, some respondents argue 
that the old system of vertical lobbying 
(lobbying between local government 
bureaucrats and central government 
bureaucrats) has been replaced by horizontal 
lobbying (lobbying between local government 
bureaucrats and local councils) at the local 
level. This is not surprising, given the previous 
evidence in this paper on the formation of local 
alliances that collude to siphon off government 
funds. The local government bureaucrat is very 
responsive toward the interests of the local 
council because it plays a dominant role in 
determining the budget. The formal power of 
the local council gives its members power to 
accommodate their own personal interests. 
Therefore, in a closed-survey Question (see 
Appendix) respondents were asked whether 
agree or not agree that the new institutional 
change in the context of regional autonomy has 
changed form of lobbying Kabupaten 
government bureaucrats and Kabupaten 
council with respect to Kabupaten government 
budget process. 
Table 6. Perception of lobbying modus 
Survey Item Sleman Badung Kupang Total Average 
1. The institutional change has changed 
Local Government lobbying modus 3.1 (1.2) 2.8 (0.9) 3.1 (0.8) 3.0 ( 0.9) 
2.  The institutional change has changed 
Local Council lobbying modus 2.2 (1.2) 2.9 (0.9) 3.2 (1.0) 2.8 (1.0) 
Number of samples  
Source: Survey Data                                   
30 21 22 73 
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Table 6 shows that the overall mean score 
was below 4 or (3.0) representing that 
respondents relative to neutral that the 
institutional change in the context of regional 
autonomy has changed both the local 
government lobbying modus in the Kabupaten 
government budget process. A Kruskal-Wallis 
test for three unrelated groups indicated that the 
samples were not different from each other 
with a statistically insignificant p value of 
>0.05.  
Similarly, Table 6 shows that the overall 
mean score was below 4 (2.8) indicating that 
respondents relative disagree to neutral that the 
institutional change in the context of regional 
autonomy has changed local council lobbying 
modus in the Kabupaten government budget 
process. A Kruskal-Wallis test for three 
unrelated groups indicated that the samples 
were not different from each other with a 
statistically insignificant p value of >0.05.  
Based on the open questionnaire, most 
respondents in Sleman report that compared to 
that in the past, there is an improvement in the 
process of budget approval, but the group’s 
interests are still altering the process. However, 
in the case of Badung, most respondent also 
explain that the local government executive is 
very responsive toward the local council’s 
interest because it plays a dominant role in 
determining the budget. They also insist that
the local Council is now not only acting as a 
“rubber stamp” but also capable in determining 
how much rupiah is needed in an activity. They 
tend to involve not only in budget policy 
formulation but also in costing. Similar with 
Badung case, most Kupang respondent state 
that Local Council only lobbying for their own 
and party’s interests. Local Council can even 
force the executive to put a certain activity into 
the budget.
Overall, based on the respondents evidence, 
we can argue that the new institutional change 
in the context of regional autonomy has 
changed form of lobbying Kabupaten 
government bureaucrats and Kabupaten 
council with respect to Kabupaten government 
budget process from vertical lobbying (lobby-
ing between local government bureaucrats and 
central government bureaucrats) to horizontal 
lobbying (lobbying between local government 
bureaucrats and local councils) at the local 
level. 
Incentives for better governance  
Incentives can play an important role in 
solving dysfunctional institutions. 
Theoretically, laws and regulations are formal 
rules that determine the incentive structure and 
thus affect the behaviour of individuals and 
private organisations (Burky and Perry, 1998: 
12). Similarly the new regional autonomy 
reforms Law No. 22 and 25, 1999 will 
determine the incentive structure and thus 
affect the behaviour of local regional autonomy 
players, such as local government and local 
council. However, if the system does not work, 
these players will most likely freely engage in 
the abuse of power. Therefore, in a closed-
survey Question (see Appendix) respondents 
were asked whether agree or not agree that the 
new institutional change in the context of 
regional autonomy has given positive incentive 
with respect to the behaviour of local 
government bureaucrats and local council in 
manage the Kabupaten government budget. 
Table 6.8 shows that the overall mean score 
was below 4 or (3.0) representing that 
respondents relative to neutral that the new 
institutional change in the context of regional 
autonomy has given positive incentive with 
respect to the behaviour of local government 
bureaucrats in manage the Kabupaten 
government budget. A Kruskal-Wallis test for 
three unrelated groups indicated that the 
samples were not different from each other 
with a statistically insignificant p value of 
>0.05.  
Similarly, Table 7 shows that the overall 
mean score was below 4 or (3.1) indicating that 
respondents the new institutional change in the 
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context of regional autonomy has given 
positive incentive with respect to the behaviour 
of local council in manage the Kabupaten 
government budget. A Kruskal-Wallis test for 
three unrelated groups indicated that the 
samples were not different from each other 
with a statistically insignificant p value of 
>0.05. 
Based on the open questionnaire, most 
respondents in Sleman report that Sleman 
Kabupaten bureaucrats have no more incentive 
in controlling the budget process. On the other 
hand, they view that the legislative is more 
dominant in approving the budget because of 
its position and authority. The legislative is 
more dominant in approving the budget 
because of its position and authority. Similarly,
most respondent in Badung mention that the 
Kabupaten legislative is more dominant in 
approving the budget because of its position 
and authority. At the beginning the executive is 
dominant, but when it comes to the discussion 
the legislative tends to be dominant. However, 
in the case of Kupang, most respondent report 
that the Kabupaten government bureaucrat is 
quite involved, while the local council is less 
involved.  
Overall, based on four important institu-
tional variables (transparency, monitoring and 
enforcement, lobbying modus and the role of 
incentive) most respondents reveal that there 
are dysfunctional institutions, especially 
information and enforcement in the context of 
local government budget process. 
Conclusions 
A close study of the local government 
budgetary processes has shown that the 
implementation of decentralisation has caused 
a shift in power, except central government 
fund. Before the new decentralisation reforms, 
most power was in the hands of central 
government in Jakarta. Local government 
mainly carried out the instructions from the 
centre. Nowadays, however, power is held by 
local councils. Local councils, as the repre-
sentative of the people, now have expanded 
powers in the budgeting process. 
One key observation from the evidence is 
that the transfer of power in Indonesia has led 
to the transfer of the abuse of power. The 
evidence indicates that the new Decentrali-
sation Laws have not only created multiple 
channels of reporting and overlapping authority 
but also opened new channels for abuse of 
power. The local elites have created a new 
regional “money politics” (See alsoMink et al., 
2002). With these new powers, regional elites 
have formed multiple alliances.  
The conclusions reached above have been 
verified by other scholars. Decentralisation can 
either strengthen or weaken opportunities and 
incentives for corruption (World Development 
Report, 2002: 108). Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(1998) (1999) (2000) claimed that 
decentralisation creates coordination problems, 
exacerbates the incentive for official to predate 
and maintain the status quo. They argue that 
local governments are more corrupt and greater 
Table 7. Perception of Incentive 
Survey Item Sleman Badung Kupang Total Average 
1. The institutional change has provided 
better incentive to Local Government 3.1 (1.0) 3.2 (1.2) 2.8 (0.9) 3.0 (1.0) 
2. The institutional change has provided 
better incentive to The Local Council 
(DPRD) 
3.4 (1.0) 3.0 (1.2) 2.9 (0.9) 3.1 (1.0) 
Number of samples  
Source: Survey Data                                     30 21 22 73 
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state capture. Similarly, Carbonera (2000) also 
argue that more decentralisation has a positive 
impact on corruption, and raising individual 
propensity to accept bribes. Inevitably, 
decentralisation and the quality of local 
government have become a major issue for 
many countries. 
In short, the good governance that was 
expected to flow from the decentralisation of 
fiscal powers has not been realised yet. Instead 
of the expected decline in abuse of power, 
opportunities for the abuse of power became 
available for ambitions local elites, creating a 
situation in which levels of abuse of power are 
higher and more widespread than before. This 
is not to say that nothing has changed. The 
main changes have been in the forms of the 
abuse of power. Decentralisation has facilitated 
a shift from the rampant centralised abuse of 
power of former years to local abuse of power 
at the Kabupaten level. This type of abuse of 
power involves local government bureaucrats, 
functionaries and members of local councils. 
Violations arise in many ways. Perhaps one 
of the most powerful is the collusion between 
the local Kabupaten executive and the local 
Kabupaten councils in, for example, linking the 
salary increases of council members to salary 
increases for the head and deputy head of the 
Kabupaten administration. As was argued in 
this paper, this kind of collusion is widespread 
and permeates patron-client relationships at all 
levels of government in dealings with 
government and non-government groups 
including local businessmen.  
The underlying problem that encourages 
this kind of collusion is the lack of civil 
institutions that are capable of controlling local 
government bodies in the interests of good 
governance.  
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